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DIAGNOSING NORMS 
We often find ourselves wondering how social practices that 
cause societal damage, violate human rights, or are plainly inef-
ficient can survive. Think of how corruption holds back eco-
nomic development, erodes public confidence in government, 
and undermines the rule of law and fair competition, or how 
child marriage forces girls out of education and into a life of 
increased risk of violence, abuse, ill health, or even early death. 
What motivates such behaviors, and why do they persist, even 
in the face of laws that prohibit them? Are these practices sup-
ported by cultural norms? How do economic and cultural 
structures interact? Which of these questions is most important 
to address? Understanding the nature of collective behaviors 
and why people engage in them is critical for the design of ap-
propriate interventions aimed at social change. There are many 
collective behaviors that are maladaptive, harmful, or violate 
what we take to be basic human rights. Addressing these behav-
iors requires disentangling the personal, social, economic, and 
cultural factors that support them and assessing their relative 
weights in sustaining these practices. 
Collective behaviors, that is, behavioral patterns shared by 
a group of individuals, may be studied in a variety of ways. For 
example, we may explore the functions they perform in a so-
ciety or group and investigate the environments within which 
they emerge or disappear. Knowing the functions a practice 
performs, however, does not tell us if those involved in it are 
aware of them, or if they act in certain ways because of them. 
We should not make the mistake of conflating the observer's 
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and the actor's points of view. We may think that a social norm 
maximizes the welfare of its followers, but this may hardly 
be the reason why they conform to it. Most of the time, par-
ticipants are not aware of the social functions that a practice 
serves. Alternatively, we may focus on the reasons why people 
engage in such behaviors by investigating the incentives and 
constraints that they face when undertaking an established be-
havior or adopting a new one. These two approaches are fully 
compatible, and the importance of stressing one or the other 
depends upon our intellectual and practical goals. Especially 
when wanting to change or promote a particular collective 
behavior, we must understand its nature and the reasons why 
people take part in it. 
In this chapter, I will distinguish between collective behav-
iors that are completely independent, as when they are purely 
determined by economic or natural reasons, and interdepen-
dent, as when other people's actions and opinions matter to 
one's choice.1 I want to differentiate actions that are undertaken 
because we care about what other people do or think from ac-
tions that we have reason to carry out without regard for other 
people's behavior or beliefs. These distinctions are important 
because in order to implement policies to encourage or dis-
courage certain collective behaviors or practices, we need to 
understand their nature, or the reasons why people engage in 
them. In what follows, I shall offer a clear and simple way to 
distinguish between independent and interdependent behav-
iors and among different types of interdependent behaviors. 
Habits, social customs, and moral injunctions are inde-
pendent, in the sense that they involve undertaking certain 
actions regardless of what others do or expect us to do. For 
1. When I say "independence," I do not refer to outcome-independence: in 
a purely competitive market, each agent acts independently, but the final 
outcome is the product of a myriad of individual choices. The market 
outcome depends on the actions of all the market participants, but this 
is not the dependence I am interested in. 
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example, we wear warm clothes in winter and use umbrellas 
when it rains, independently of what our friends or neighbors 
do, and we may obey kashrut dietary laws whether or not 
other Jews respect them. Conventions such as signaling sys-
tems, fads, fashions, and social norms such as reciprocity rules 
are all interdependent behaviors, and social norms are the 
foremost example of interdependence. However, as I will make 
clear later on, not all collective behaviors are interdependent, 
and not all interdependent behaviors are social norms. 
This chapter draws on Bicchieri 2006, ch. 1, although some 
of the details provided here are different from those in the 
book. Here my aim is to offer simple tools that help to quickly 
decide whether the collective behavior we care about is a norm 
or more simply a shared custom, and if it is a norm, what sort 
of norm it is. Without this knowledge, promoting social change 
would be difficult, as we would be at a loss about where and 
how to intervene. The same practice could be a custom, a con-
vention, or a social norm in different populations. Being able to 
determine why it is followed will help us suggest the most ap-
propriate intervention. In what follows I shall rely on concepts 
such as expectations and preferences, all of which are relatively 
easy to measure and handle, especially in light of wanting to 
conduct experiments or field surveys. How we come to the con-
clusion that a collective behavior is a social norm is the subject 
of the next chapter, where I will discuss ways to measure norms 
that are based on the concepts introduced here. 
Here I shall offer a few static definitions. They are static 
because in real life, the social constructs I talk about may 
morph into each other and often do. A custom may become a 
social norm in time, and a social norm may revert to a custom 
(think of the use of white wedding dresses). This dynamic pro-
cess merits investigation, but for the moment I will be treating 
social constructs as separate, fixed entities. This classification 
will help us diagnose the nature of a practice or action pattern, 
in turn suggesting the best way to encourage or discourage it. 
4 I NORMS IN THE WILD 
How individuals relate to certain patterns of behavior deter-
mines the pattern's nature. There are highways where most 
people drive over the speed limit, precincts with low voter 
turnout, pockets of resistance to polio vaccination, littered 
environments, countries where bribing is endemic, and cul-
tures where girls are married at a very young age. What drives 
these behaviors? Are choices independent or interdependent? 
Understanding the motives behind these collective behaviors 
is critical to changing them. 
Diagnosing collective patterns of behavior as interdepen-
dent, and being very specific about the nature of this interde-
pendence, will help us decide what sort of intervention offers 
the best chance of success. Think of widespread HIV awareness 
campaigns in African countries, where condoms are freely dis-
tributed to the population, yet the number of newly infected 
people is increasing. Distributing condoms and relying on 
information campaigns about the risks of unprotected sex is 
insufficient if men share a common view of masculinity that 
glorifies promiscuity and if they refrain from using condoms 
at home for fear of giving away the existence of "other women." 
When behaviors are interdependent, we have to consider entire 
communities, as individuals' choices depend on what people 
who are important to them do, and possibly also on what they 
judge appropriate or inappropriate. 
Think of child marriage, an interdependent practice that 
many governments and international organizations are actively 
trying to eliminate. According to the International Center for 
Research on Women (ICRW), 100 million girls will be married 
before the age of eighteen in the coming decade. Most live in 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Asian Subcontinent. A variety of 
potential causes have been explored. The parents of child brides 
are often poor and use marriage as a way to provide for their 
daughter's future, especially in areas where there are few eco-
nomic opportunities for women. Some families use marriage 
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to build and strengthen alliances, to seal property deals, settle 
disputes, or pay off debts. In some cultures, child marriage is 
encouraged to increase the number of pregnancies and ensure 
enough children survive into adulthood to work on family 
land and support elderly relatives. In South Asia, some fami-
lies marry off all their daughters at the same time to reduce 
the cost of the wedding ceremony. Chastity and family honor 
are another major reason, as many parents want to make sure 
their daughters do not have a child out-of-wedlock (Bicchieri, 
Lindemans, and Jiang 2014). 
There are a variety of cultural reasons for child marriage, 
but in most cases, the social pressure to marry very young girls 
is intense. In India's southern state of Tamil Nadu, some com-
munities have a strong social stigma against girls being mar-
ried after puberty. Often African families report fearing that 
if girls receive an education, they will be less willing to fulfill 
their traditional roles as wife and mother, and so it will be diffi-
cult for them to find a husband, with negative consequences for 
the family. Trying to induce a change in behavior critically de-
pends upon understanding the reasons behind the choices. In 
many cases such choices are driven by a combination of shared 
factual beliefs (about the value of education and how best to 
protect a girl), social expectations (what other families do and 
think is appropriate), and normative (or religious) constraints 
(what good parents should do). 
Let us imagine two separate groups who marry their 
daughters as soon as they reach puberty. These practices 
look identical, but th~ beliefs supporting them are very dif-
ferent, and these differences have major consequences for 
policies aimed at curbing the practice. Members of the first 
group believe their religion calls for early marriage, and de-
viating from a religious injunction will bring disgrace to 
the entire family. They may entertain a host of other beliefs 
about marriage: they may believe that a young bride is more 
6 I NORMS IN THE WILD 
valuable, more fertile, more likely to obey her in-laws, will 
be protected from sexual violence or out-of-wedlock births 
that would dishonor the family, and so on. The members of 
the second group have similar beliefs, but lack the religious 
principle that fosters the first group's practice. In both cases, 
the social pressure to marry young girls will be intense, but 
within the first group the religious beliefs will represent a 
major stumbling block to changing marriage practices. We 
may work hard to change some factual beliefs in both groups, 
and possibly succeed. We may build safe schools for girls, 
and help appease fears of violence and dishonor, pay parents 
for attendance and subsequently provide jobs to the girls, 
but the unconditional allegiance to a religious creed will be 
much harder to overcome. I will explore the factors that dif-
ferentiate these two groups-which would inform the design 
of policies aiming at changing these practices-in a later sec-
tion of this chapter. 
CONDITIONAL PREFERENCES 
In what follows I offer a simple way to discriminate between 
behavioral patterns shared by a group. The concepts I use to 
this effect are those of preference and expectation. Preferences 
are dispositions to act in a particular way in a specific situa-
tion. When I say that I prefer to drive to school instead of 
taking the train, I mean that, if given the choice, I would take 
the car. Often people make the mistake of equating preference 
with "liking better." If I choose a vanilla ice cream instead of a 
chocolate one, you may infer that I like vanilla better. What you 
may not know is that I adore chocolate but am allergic to it. So 
despite liking chocolate more, I prefer (choose) vanilla instead. 
What preference really means is that, in a choice situation, if 
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I choose A over B it must be the case that, all things considered, 
I prefer A. Preference and choice are thus strictly connected. 
Preferences may be strictly individual (like the ice cream 
example), or they may be social. For example, I may not eat ice 
cream when I am out with friends since they have passionate 
views about dieting. Social preferences may take into account 
the behavior, beliefs, and outcomes of other people that, pre-
sumably, matter to the decision maker. Some such preferences 
are consequentialist, in that the decision maker only cares 
about the final outcome, not how it was obtained, nor whether 
the other parties had expectations about his or her choice. Say 
you have a preference for fair divisions. Then, if you have to 
choose how to allocate some good, you will take into account. 
how much of it goes to other claimants, and you may feel guilty 
if you take too much for yourself. Alternatively, you may be 
envious and resent an allocation that grants a larger share to 
others, or you might even be spiteful and want to maximize the 
difference between what you and others receive. In all of these 
cases, you care about what you get and what others get, too. 
You make social comparisons, but you may not be concerned 
about what the other parties do or believe, or how the outcome 
came about. Your only concern is how the final outcome is al-
located. So someone who decides to split a sum of money into 
equal parts may be moved by an independent desire to be fair, 
or instead she may respond to what she believes is expected of 
her. In both cases we say that she has a social preference, though 
she might be influenced either by a social comparison or by 
social expectations. 
Social preferences that are based on social comparisons 
can be unconditional, in that one's choice is not influenced by 
knowing how others act in similar situations or what they ap-
prove/disapprove of. If instead one chooses an action based on 
expectations about what others do or believe should be done, 
then such preferences are conditional on those actions and 
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beliefs. For example, a mother may choose to overtly beat her 
child because all the other parents around her do so, and she 
fears being looked down upon or reprimanded if she does 
not hit him hard. In fact, she might not like to punish so 
harshly, but what would the neighbors think of her? In this 
case, we say that her "preference" for corporal punishment is 
conditional upon her social expectations. She chooses to hit 
because she sees other parents hitting, and she believes that 
she would suffer negative consequences if she behaved differ-
ently and her behavior could be detected. Saying that she has 
a social preference for beating her disobedient child does not 
tell us whether her preference is unconditional, that is, she 
is genuinely convinced about the merits of corporal punish-
ment, or is conditional, in that she is influenced by what her 
neighbors think and do. 
Returning to the case of fair division, you may not care at 
all about fairness per se, but you nevertheless divide the good 
equally because you are sensitive to what others normally do 
and expect you to do. In other words, you have a preference for 
sharing conditional on the fact that others share. This is quite 
different from being independently motivated to act fairly. The 
social preferences I will be talking about are mostly condi-
tional, in the sense that the behaviors of interest often depend 
on what other people that matter to the actor think and do. 
Interdependent actions, as we shall see, always involve socially 
conditional preferences. 2 Table 1.1 describes different kinds of 
preferences, using the simple example of preferring or not pre-
ferring to eat apples. 
Preferences should not be confused with what social psy-
chologists call "attitudes" (Fishbein 1967). An attitude is under-
stood as an evaluative disposition toward some object, person, 
2. From now on, when I talk of conditional preferences, I always mean 
"socially" conditional preferences. 
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Table 1.1 
CLASSIFYING DIFFERENT TYPES OF PREFERENCES 
Individual preferences Social preferences 
Unconditional "I want apples." "I want more apples 
than you." 
Conditional "I want apples if it is "I want apples if my 
autumn." friends want apples." 
or behavior. It can be expressed by statements such as "I like/ 
dislike," "I believe one should/should not," and "I approve/dis-
approve of." Attitudes thus include personal normative beliefs 
that express a person's positive or negative evaluation of par-
ticular behaviors. Such personal normative beliefs, in turn, can 
be prudential, or they can have a "moral"3 motivation. I may 
disapprove of smoking in a prudential sense because I know its 
negative health effects. In other words, I believe that smoking is 
inadvisable or not in one's best interest. Historically, smoking 
by women was strongly disapproved in a moral sense in that 
it was seen as a sign of debauchery and lack of womanly vir-
tues. Such a moral personal normative belief implies that one's 
ethical convictions motivate disapproval. I shall return to this 
point in the next section. 
We know from economics that preferences and choices are 
positively correlated. What about attitudes and choices? We 
might expect that people who positively evaluate a particular 
behavior would engage in the behavior to a greater degree than 
others might. If a group of people thinks that drinking alcohol 
is acceptable, should we not witness a lot of drinking in this 
3. Here and elsewhere, I use "moral" in the broad sense of the term, as 
referring to certain codes of conduct adopted by an individual, a group 
or a society. 
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population? Unfortunately, it has been consistently observed 
that general attitudes and behavior are weakly correlated, if 
they are correlated at all (Wicker 1969).4 Individuals may ex-
press positive judgments toward behaviors that they neverthe-
less do not engage in. Why so? To answer, consider that most of 
our choices are not made in a vacuum. We are social animals 
embedded in thick networks of relations, and what we do has 
consequences, for us and for others. Interdependence, not in-
dependence, rules social life. Indeed, a host of studies show that 
the main variable affecting behavior is not what one person-
ally likes or thinks he should do, but rather one's belief about 
what "society" (i.e., most other people, people who matter to us, 
and the like) approves of (see, e.g., Bicchieri and Muldoon 2011; 
Fishbein 1967). 
A woman might prefer not to breastfeed after giving birth, 
even if she has learned about the advantages of feeding colos-
trum to the baby, or a family might prefer to give their young 
daughter in marriage even if they would have liked it better to 
send her to school and wait. These choices occur regardless of 
the mother or family's attitudes toward these practices. All these 
preferences are conditional on expecting people who matter 
to us to do the same, approve of such behaviors, and possibly 
punish deviations. Having a conditional preference implies that 
one may have a reason to avoid early breastfeeding or marry 
off one's child, which is different from liking and endorsing 
these practices. To uncover the reasons why a collective behav-
ior survives, we have to look beyond attitudes to the beliefs and 
conditional preferences of those who engage in it. This is why I 
like to use almost exclusively preferences and expectations in 
4. However, when there is a high level of correspondence between an at-
titude and a behavior, then attitudes can be predictive of behaviors; see 
Ajzen and Fishbein 1977. 
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my analysis of norms. They are easy to measure, and measuring 
them lets us meaningfully classify collective behaviors. 
SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS 
People who have conditional social preferences care about what 
others who matter to them do and/or approve of. They have 
expectations that influence their behavior (Bicchieri 2014). A 
driver will stop on red and go on green because she has expecta-
tions about how other drivers will behave and how they expect 
her to behave. A parent who beats a child will have expecta-
tions about what other parents in his neighborhood do, and how 
they may judge him. These expectations are just beliefs. We have 
all sorts of beliefs. We believe that tomorrow it will rain, and 
we believe that people drive faster on I-96 than the speed limit 
and are hardly monitored. Beliefs can be factual or they can be 
normative. Both "I believe that colostrum is dirty and danger-
ous for the baby" and "I believe that dowry costs increase with 
the bride's age" are factual beliefs, beliefs about states of affairs, 
though only one is true. As we shall see later on, belief change 
is an important part of social change. People need reasons to 
change, and realizing that some of their factual beliefs are false 
can give them the needed push to consider alternatives. Beliefs 
like "women should cover their heads and faces" are instead 
normative, in that the "should" expresses an evaluation-it sig-
nals approval of veiling women. 
Expectations are beliefs about what is going to happen or 
what should happen; both presuppose a continuity between 
past and present or future. In what follows, I will only refer 
to social expectations, that is, the expectations we have about 
other people's behaviors and beliefs. Some social expectations 
are factual or empirical: they are beliefs about how other people 
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are going to act or react in certain situations. We may have ob-
served how people behave, or some trusted source may have 
told us that people behave in such and such a way. If we have 
reason to believe that they will continue to act as in the past, 
we will have formed empirical expectations about their future 
behavior. What matters to our analysis is that very often these 
empirical expectations influence our decisions. For example, if 
every time I go to England I observe people driving on the left 
side of the road, and I have no reason to think there has been 
a change, I will expect left-side driving the next time around. 
Wanting to avoid an accident, I will drive on the left side, too. 
Other social expectations are normative, in that they ex-
press our belief that other people believe (and will continue to 
believe) that certain behaviors are praiseworthy and should be 
carried out, while others should be avoided. Normative (social) 
expectations are beliefs about other people's personal normative 
beliefs (i.e., they are second-order beliefs). "I believe that the 
women in my village believe that a good mother should abstain 
from nursing her newborn baby" is a normative expectation, 
and it may have a powerful influence on behavior. Table 1.2 
exemplifies the important differences between different types 
of beliefs. 
Table 1.2 
CLASSIFICATION OF NORMATIVE/NON-NORMATIVE 
AND SOCIAL/NON-SOCIAL BELIEFS 
Non-social beliefs Social beliefs 
Non-normative Factual beliefs Empirical expectations 
beliefs 
Normative beliefs Personal normative Normative expectations 
beliefs 
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Important distinctions among personal normative beliefs 
are often missed in surveys, because questions about attitudes 
are often too vague to capture these distinctions. Attitude 
questions can include questions about personal normative 
beliefs, but no distinction is made between prudential versus 
"moral" normative beliefs. It is important to recognize the dif-
ference between different types of normativity. For example, 
a survey may pose questions like "do you believe that a wife 
should refrain from committing adultery?"; all the researcher 
attains with such questions are just the nonspecific personal 
normative beliefs of the responder. 5 Say two people, A nan and 
Dayo, both answer "yes" to the first question. Anan thinks that 
adultery always ultimately gets discovered, and the adulterer 
would be wise to renounce carnal temptations to avoid pun-
ishment, so her answer reflects a prudential "should." Dayo's 
answer instead reflects her judgment about adultery as a rep-
rehensible breach of faith and trust in a marriage, regardless 
of the social consequences such actions incur. Dayo's "should" 
has a different, strongly normative connotation. How would 
new information change their minds? Given an environment 
in which adultery is tolerated or reliably undetectable, Anan 
could easily change her mind, but Dayo would not be swayed 
in her conviction about the ills of adultery. I shall discuss the 
difficulties involved in belief change in chapter 3. 
Personal normative beliefs may or may not coincide with 
one's normative expectations. A woman may believe that she 
ought to infibulate her daughter, or she may be less sanguine 
about infibulation, and in both cases believe that her fellow vil-
lagers think she ought to infibulate her child. If she is obey-
ing her group's norm to infibulate the child, regardless of her 
5. I am for the moment assuming that the responder is sincere and a social 
desirability bias has been avoided. As we shall see in chapter 2, this as-
sumption is often wrong. · 
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personal normative beliefs, her behavior will be influenced by 
her beliefs about what relevant others think she should do-
that is, her normative expectations. Notice that normative ex-
pectations always express an indirect evaluation: one believes 
that other people think one ought to behave in a certain way 
(or refrain from behaving in a certain way), where the ought, as 
we shall see, is not merely prudent. The man who beats his wife 
may believe that his neighbors approve of such behavior, that 
they think he should chastise her if she misbehaves. Again, this 
expectation presupposes some continuity between what was 
approved/disapproved in the past and what is approved/disap-
proved now and in the future. 
But whose actions or approval do we care about? Depending 
on the circumstances, different people will matter to our deci-
sions. They may be family members, clan or village members, 
religious authorities, co-workers, bystanders, and whoever 
in that moment has the power to influence our choice. What 
we expect them to do matters; what we think they believe we 
ought to do matters. I call the range of people whom we care 
about when making particular decisions our reference network 
because they may be spread around and not be physically pres-
ent. The Pakistani man who killed his "dishonored" daughter 
in Milan, where he had lived for twenty years, was only con-
cerned with the strict honor code of the relatives and friends 
in his Pakistani village. That was his reference network, not 
his Italian co-workers or neighbors. In Brazil, favela dwellers 
only punish stealing within their group, not stealing outside 
their group, so an action that is prohibited within a reference 
network may be permissible outside of it. It is important to 
keep in mind that a crucial element of any empirical study of 
social norms will be the identification of the reference network 
against which expectations are set. 
For the time being, let us agree that there are two types 
of social expectations, empirical and normative, that they 
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involve a reference network, and often, alone or in combina-
tion, influence our behavior. Let us now see what might be 
the relation between preferences, expectations, and patterns 
of behavior. 
CUSTOMS 
Imagine observing a common pattern of behavior: when it 
rains, we see that people normally use umbrellas. Do they use 
umbrellas because other people do? Are their choices influ-
enced by social expectations? If so, which expectations matter? 
Would they use umbrellas irrespective of what others do? These 
are questions we should ask if we want to diagnose the nature 
of collective behaviors. 
Like using umbrellas when it rains, certain action patterns 
are created and sustained by the motivations of actors acting 
independently. Suppose you live in an environment where 
water is scarce and latrines do not exist. All find it useful to 
satisfy their bodily needs by defecating in the open. This action 
meets their needs and will therefore be repeated. This repeti-
tion will create a habit. Since people have similar needs, the 
habitual action that meets their needs will become a custom. 
The consistency of the pattern is due to the actors' similar moti-
vations and conditions. Each actor acts independently, and the 
result is an emergent pattern of behavior that reproduces itself. 
Each individual knows that everybody else in her community 
acts in a similar way, but this awareness does not serve as a 
motive for doing what one does anyway, out of sheer need or 
convenience. As we shall see later on, these motives may act as 
drags on social change. I thus define a custom as follows: 
A custom is a pattern of behavior such that individuals (uncondi-
tionally) prefer to conform to it because it meets their needs. 
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Clearly, in the case of customs, preferences are unconditional. 
Expecting other people to behave in a similar way does not in-
fluence one's behavior, since this expectation is not a reason to 
persist in or change one's habit. We know that other people use 
umbrellas, but so what? Whatever they do, we will keep using 
our umbrellas when it rains! 
Not all customs are benign, though they may efficiently 
serve some basic needs. Open defecation is an example of a 
custom that presents a huge sanitation problem in many parts 
of the world. It is estimated that 15 percent of the world pop-
ulation practices open defecation, with extremely negative 
health consequences, as well as social costs that are less easy 
to quantify.6 
Customs can change in several ways. We may discover al-
ternative, better means to satisfy our needs, the external con-
ditions that produce these needs may cease to exist, new pref-
erences may be created, or a combination of such changes may 
come about. Sometimes we come to grasp the advantages of 
new behaviors, but if there are costs involved, change may be 
hard to come by. This difficulty is due to the fact that the pro-
posed alternative often requires collective action. The collec-
tive custom is a pattern of independent actions, but chang-
ing it introduces interdependencies. For example, abandoning 
open defecation requires first a change in factual beliefs about 
the health and social costs of this practice. The next step 
consists in building latrines, using them, and maintaining 
6. The majority of those practicing open defecation live in rural areas. Open 
defecation in rural areas persists in every region of the developing world, 
even among those who have otherwise reached high levels of improved 
sanitation use. For instance, the proportion of rural dwellers still prac-
ticing open defecation is 9 percent in Northern Africa and 17 percent 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Open defecation is highest in 
rural areas of Southern Asia, where it is practiced by 55 percent of the 
population. 
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them operational. This process requires the engagement of the 
whole community, which has to allocate tasks and ensure that 
the old ways are abandoned; otherwise the health benefits of 
having functioning latrines may be lost. Here the individual in-
centive to continue with the established habit may conflict with 
the collective benefit of having better sanitation. People facing 
change confront a social dilemma: it is individually tempting 
(and most convenient) to stick to the old habit, but everyone 
would benefit from a collective shift to latrines. Yet if only some 
use latrines, the sanitation benefit is lost: water and land pollu-
tion will still occur. In this case, not only would everyone have 
to be convinced to change their ways, but the new behavior, 
in order to survive, would have to be supported by both the 
expectation that others are engaging in it and the expectation 
that most people think that the behavior should be followed. 
Such expectations played no role in the custom's survival, but 
they become critical for its demise. 
What matters for the present discussion is that a collective 
process of belief change may be necessary to implement a new 
pattern of behavior, even when abandoning simple customs, 
especially if the new behavior requires the collaboration of ev-
eryone to be sustained. Collective belief change may not be suf-
ficient in all those cases in which carrying out the new behavior 
involves a social dilemma. In cases of open defecation, build-
ing and maintaining latrines requires a collective effort and the 
introduction of sanctions to ensure continuous compliance, 
since even a few defectors can have a powerfully detrimental 
effect on a group's hygiene. Therefore monitoring adherence to 
the new behavior becomes all the more critical. Yet the intro-
duction of sanctions, though crucial, is secondary to the initial 
process of factual belief change. People must first recognize the 
negative consequences of open defecation. How customs can be 
changed, and the challenges of sustaining new behaviors, is a 
topic I will discuss in the third chapter. 
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DESCRIPTIVE NORMS 
There are many collective behaviors that may look like customs 
but are instead influenced by social expectations. These collec-
tive behaviors depend on expectations about what others do or 
expect one to do in a similar situation. Such behaviors display 
various degrees of interdependence, depending on whether 
expectations are normative or empirical, unilateral or multi-
lateral. I use the word descriptive norm to refer to all those in-
terdependent behaviors where preferences are conditional on 
empirical expectations alone. 
Let me add a note of warning, since my definition is un-
conventional. The term "descriptive norm" is widely employed 
to mean "what is commonly done," what is usual and cus-
tomary (Schultz et al. 2007). It describes how people typically 
act, what they regularly do in particular situations. I find this 
definition too vague and of little practical use. The traditional 
understanding of a descriptive norm includes, for example, a 
custom like open defecation, a fashion like wearing high heels, 
or the use of a common signaling system, like traffic lights or 
language, for coordination purposes. 
While the perceived existence of a custom alone does not 
cause people to engage in it, the perceived existence of a fash-
ion or common signaling system can do so. A custom is a con-
sequence of independently motivated actions that happen to 
be similar to each other, whereas a common signaling system 
causes action via the joint force of expectations and a desire 
to coordinate with other users of the system. The existence of 
an established fashion causes an action that is consistent with 
it via the presence of expectations and the desire to imitate 
the trendy. Depending on the context, one might copy those 
in proximity, those in similar situations, those with similar 
characteristics, or those who are similar in some other relevant 
way. One may copy either what one perceives to be the most 
DIAGNOSING NORMS I 19 
frequent action or the most successful actors. Women buy very 
high heels not for the (zero) comfort of the shoe, but instead 
because they want to be fashionable, copy trendsetters, and 
expect other women in their circle to do the same. Once a fash-
ion is established, it will induce actions in line with it. I thus 
define a descriptive norm as follows (Bicchieri 2006): 
A descriptive norm is a pattern of behavior such that individu-
als prefer to conform to it on condition that they believe that 
most people in their reference network conform to it (empirical 
expectation). 
There are two elements here that differentiate a descriptive 
norm from a shared custom. In the case of a descriptive norm, 
people do not prefer to engage in a particular behavior irrespec-
tive of what others do. Instead, their preference for conformity 
is conditional upon observing (or believing) how others act. The 
"others" in this case must be somehow relevant to the actor. The 
reference network may be scattered, and may not necessarily co-
incide with groups one associates with daily. In the television 
series The Sopranos, many of the characters' behaviors were 
based on what they (wrongly) believed to be the customary ways 
in Italy, only to realize later on that modern Italians had moved 
well beyond those patterns. A young woman in Philadelphia 
wearing very high heels will probably not care what other 
women do in India, or even New Orleans. Her reference net-
work may be the "fashionable" crowd in her town, those who she 
is likely to meet and give her a chance to "show off;' or it may be 
a celebrity, magazine starlets, or TV series that girls in her refer-
ence network follow. 7 In the case of significant media influence, 
it is important to recognize that those who watch the television 
7. The TV show Sex and the City was associated with a spike in sales of 
Manolo Blahnik shoes. 
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program or read the popular magazine know that "everyone is 
reading/watching that" where "everyone" presumably refers to 
people that matter to one's choice to adopt a fashion. One of the 
reasons the media can be so influential in initiating or changing 
behavior is precisely the viewer or reader's awareness that many 
others in her reference network receive the same message. 
In descriptive norms, expectations about what others are 
doing play a decisive role in choosing (or avoiding) an action, 
as in their absence different actions may be chosen. The main 
difference between a custom and a descriptive norm lies in the 
reasons why people follow them, since from an observational 
viewpoint, the practices may look identical. Understanding this 
distinction is crucial if we want to promote behavioral change. To 
change a negative custom, we may want to start by trying to con-
vince individuals that a particular action or practice-though it 
meets a need-has serious drawbacks, and then propose feasible 
alternatives. People normally have factual beliefs about the con-
sequences of their actions, and changing those beliefs is the first 
step to changing behavior. With descriptive norms, we have to 
engage the norm-following group in a more complex way, as ex-
pectations play a crucial role in sustaining the practice. To enact 
change, the empirical expectations of most participants have to 
change. This proves to be challenging, as change, to succeed, has 
to be synchronized. If I wear very high heels because of the drive 
to imitate the fashionable and the concurring belief that most 
women in my social network now wear them, it is not sufficient 
to observe a few women behaving differently (especially if they 
are not trendsetters).8 I must be convinced that very high heels 
8. Trendsetters are early adopters, people who start (or follow early on) a 
·new trend before most other people. Psychologists still debate whether 
there are specific character traits that make people trendsetters, apart 
from their social position (some may be in positions of power or privi-
lege). I discuss trendsetters' characteristics in much more detail in 
chapter 5. 
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are now out of fashion. The same goes for a signaling system. 
Since our goal is coordinated communication, we have to be 
convinced that everybody we may communicate with is moving 
to another system of signals before we change, too. Coordinated 
change is obviously critical. How this can be accomplished is the 
subject of the last two chapters, where I discuss social change. 
What should be clear is that the means employed to change a 
collective practice must be tailored to its nature. 
Imitation and Coordination 
Why people have conditional preferences, why they prefer to 
do something if they expect others to do it, and why some be-
haviors become viral are all questions relevant to understand-
ing social change, especially change that involves abandoning 
or creating norms. Economic, legal, and political changes often 
instigate or accompany norm change. Yet if norms, descriptive 
or otherwise, exist because followers have certain preferences 
and expectations, exogenous changes might not be sufficient to 
induce meaningful behavioral change. In any event, they will 
be successful only if they produce and coordinate a collective 
change in expectations. 
In his essay "On Sumptuary Laws," Montaigne ([1580] 
2003) cleverly observed that sixteenth-century French laws 
aiming at restricting superfluous and excessive consumption 
among the merchant class often had the opposite effect. 
The way by which our laws attempt to regulate idle and vain ex-
penses in meat and clothes, seems to be quite contrary to the end 
designed . . . . For to enact that none but princes shall eat turbot, 
shall wear velvet or gold lace, and interdict these things to the 
people, what is it but to bring them into a greater esteem, and 
to set every one more agog to eat and wear them? (Montaigne 
[1580] 2003, 300) 
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In this case, prohibiting imitation of the aristocratic ways 
made them ever more attractive to commoners. If anything, 
preferences were reinforced. 
In other cases exogenous triggers may work quite well. 
When we want to coordinate with others, any change in expec-
tations will lead to a change in (conditional) preferences and 
behavior. An external intervention that credibly changes social 
expectations will most certainly produce a change in prefer-
ences in this setting. On September 3, 1967, traffic in Sweden 
switched from driving on the left-hand side of the road to the 
right. The change was mandated by the government and went 
on smoothly, presumably because nobody wanted to keep driv-
ing on the left side of the road when the expectation was that 
now everybody would drive on the right-hand side. 
Coordination is different from imitation. With imitation, 
those I imitate do not expect me to behave like they do and may 
not even know they are being imitated, so my expectations are 
unilateral. When a girl imitates an actress or the fashionable 
group in her school, they do not expect her to act as they do. 
What matters is that she expects them to act in a certain way. 
And this is true for each and every imitator. With coordination, 
expectations are instead multilateral. If you and I want to coor-
dinate on wearing a bandanna of the same color, it matters what 
each of us expects the other to do. To succeed, our expectations 
have to match. An external intervention can potentially change 
social behavior if it works as a coordinating device, changing 
multilateral expectations. It is much less apt to succeed with 
imitation, unless it mandates a change in the imitated party. 
Many descriptive norms do not directly fulfill a coordina-
tion function, even if we observe what appears to be coordi-
nated behavior. It is often noticed that portfolio managers tend 
to make similar financial choices and offer similar advice to 
clients. One reason for this is that nobody is capable of predict-
ing market gyrations, and in case the market tanks it is better 
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to be aligned with the herd, so as to diffuse responsibility for a 
bad choice and relativize losses. Those managers do not inten-
tionally coordinate, but rather imitate each other. Imitative be-
havior is widespread in every society. When uncertain, we look 
at what others are doing to resolve insecurity about making a 
decision. Before buying a refrigerator or a car, or hiring a land-
scaper, we often go to web sites that list buyers' comments about 
products and services. Websites like Angie's List, Yahoo, or 
Amazon owe their fortune to social proof, our tendency to imi-
tate others' choices because we grant them superior knowledge 
of the product or service (they bought it!). 
Imitation, or conformity to others' behavior, has two com-
ponents: informational and normative (Deutsch and Gerard 
1955). In new, uncertain, or ambiguous situations, we often 
turn to others to gather information and obtain guidance. 
Imitation may be rational if collecting information is very hard 
or very costly, if we lack expertise, or instead if the choice is 
unimportant, so a wrong decision is not the end of the world. 
When many people make similar choices, we tend to take it as 
evidence of effective, adaptive behavior. Note that largenum-
bers are not necessary to induce imitation. People often imitate 
the behavior of the successful, guessing that some observable 
traits correlate with their accomplishments. "Dress for success" 
is a glaring example of this na'ive belief. 
We all have a natural desire "to be correct," and often what 
is correct is defined by our social reality: I know I am a good 
runner when I compare my record to those of other runners. 
The case of financial managers is a little different: their herd-
ing behavior has the effect of minimizing potential losses. In 
situations of great uncertainty, it pays to "follow the herd," for 
if circumstances deteriorate, one will not look that bad ("every-
one was doing it!"). 
Besides being correct, people also want to be liked, to 
belong, and to "go along with the crowd." We often adopt the 
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prevailing group standards and behaviors to gain (or avoid 
losing) social appreciation, respect, and acceptance. In the case 
of informational influence, there is no social pressure to con-
form to other people's views and beliefs, nor is one expected 
to conform. As I said, expectations are unilateral. With nor-
mative influence, there may or may not be group pressure to 
conform. That is, one may conform because one wants to gain 
acceptance or be liked, but a lack of conformity will not neces-
sarily be reproached by the group. 
Let us go back for a moment to our fashion slave. What 
motivates her to buy those uncomfortable, high-heel shoes? 
Both informational and normative influences are likely at 
work. On the one hand, she wants to imitate the fashionable 
crowd, as looking at what they wear is giving her valuable in-
formation about what is now "in." On the other hand, being 
fashionable makes her feel she belongs to a valuable group, and 
she will possibly become more popular if she dresses like them. 
However, nobody is going to require that she wears high heels, 
and nobody will spend time and energy reprimanding her for 
not doing so. 
A similar case was reported by a participant in the Penn-
UNICEF training course on social norms. The wife of a village 
chief independently decided to breastfeed her children from 
birth. This was unusual behavior because it was widely believed 
that colostrum was dirty and might damage the baby. The fact 
that the woman was powerful and that her children seemed 
healthy "despite" being breastfed at an early age induced a wave 
of imitation. In this case, there was the normative influence of 
wanting to imitate and please the powerful in addition to the 
informational influence of the confidence that she displayed 
when defying old habits. 
A different case is one in which employees in a coffee shop 
"salt" the tip jar. Here they play on the common tendency of 
"doing as others do" and wish clients will be induced to leave a 
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tip, like others appear to have done. They hope clients will feel 
social pressure to leave a tip. Again, there is no evident reproach 
for not doing it, aside from perhaps a slight embarrassment on 
the client's part. Fashions and fads, "imitating the successful," 
social proof, and salting the tip jar are all examples of behaviors 
that are driven by unilateral expectations. 
Now think of coordinating on a signal, a multilateral situ-
ation. Signals may be as complex as a language, or as simple 
as traffic lights. Here the normative influence may vary from 
nil to significant. If I stop using a signal that many others use, 
as in the case of a widely spoken language, nobody will pos-
sibly care, and I will be the only one to pay a price, for I will 
be ignored. But think of stopping (unilaterally) to obey traffic 
lights. Running a red light not only endangers my own life, but 
also endangers other people's lives as well. To safely use traffic 
lights, everyone must expect that all drivers stop at red and go 
at green. If people start disregarding the signal, coordination 
is lost, and everybody is put at risk. When we call those who 
disregard a red light "crazy" or "idiots," we imply that they are 
doing something that can damage them too. So, there certainly 
is a normative influence here, but is it superseding everything 
else? What are the main reasons why people stop at a red light? 
Is there a temptation not to? If there were no blame for disre-
garding traffic signals, would people disregard them? If your 
reason to stop is that you expect other drivers to obey traffic 
lights and thus drive smoothly and safely, your empirical ex-
pectation and the desire to coordinate with other drivers are 
what matters most to your choice. Traffic conventions, once es-
tablished, do not require the force of law or social enforcement 
to sustain themselves. It is in everyone's self-interest to follow 
the convention, as deviation does not pay. 
The coordination motive is very different from imitation, 
in that expectations are multilateral and stem from a desire to 
harmonize our actions with those of others so that each of our 
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individual goals can be achieved. Signaling systems, language 
rules, rules of etiquette, and dress codes are all examples of de-
scriptive norms that are driven by multilateral expectations. 
A preference for following a descriptive norm may involve 
both informational and normative influences, or the wish to 
coordinate with others, but this preference remains conditional 
on empirical expectations alone. This means that if these expec-
tations were to change, preferences and behavior would change 
too. There is a causal relationship between expectations, prefer-
ences, and behavior. If we want to claim that descriptive norms 
have causal influence, it is not sufficient to look for a correlation 
between expectations and behavior as evidence (i.e., to observe 
that certain expectations and certain behaviors frequently 
occur together). There are many correlations that are caus-
ally irrelevant. Wearing warm clothes in winter is a collective 
habit motivated by the need to keep the body warm. We do 
not choose to wear warm clothes because we expect others to 
wear them. 9 Our choice is independent of expectations. If we 
were to query Philadelphia residents, we would find out that ev-
eryone expects other residents to wear warm clothes in winter. 
And we may also observe that the individuals we have queried 
wear warm clothes in winter. We do have a correlation between 
expectations and choices (they occur together in a consistent 
way). But are those expectations causally relevant to the behav-
ior we observe? Or does the observed behavior instead generate 
the expectation? 
Causal relations involve counterfactual dependence: A and 
B both occurred, but if A had not occurred (and B had no other 
sufficient cause), B would not have occurred either. For exam-
ple, if we think that lack of water is the main reason why people 
do not build latrines, we must be prepared to say that, if water 
9. That said, the kind of warm clothes we wear may be fashion-based, and 
thus influenced by expectations. 
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were abundant (contrary to the fact that it is scarce), then la-
trines would be built and used.10 I am greatly simplifying here, 
but these are the basic ideas. We can be pretty sure that were 
we to observe people going around scantily dressed in a harsh 
winter, our expectations would change, but our behavior would 
not. When I was teaching at Carnegie Mellon University, many 
computer students braved the winter snow in T-shirts, shorts, 
and flip-flops. Most of us looked at them as alien nerds as we 
snuggled in our warm coats. 
My view about descriptive norms, as opposed to customs, 
is that they have a causal influence on behavior. Expecting 
members of our reference network to behave according to the 
descriptive norm (i.e., expecting a consistent pattern of behav-
ior), and having preferences conditional on these expectations 
induces individuals to conform to that pattern. In this case, we 
would observe that expectations and behavior are strongly cor-
related, but to know why we must know what mechanism pro-
duces the correlation. To find out, we need to experimentally 
manipulate one or more factors (the independent variables) to 
observe their effect on behavior (the dependent variable). It is 
important to give both independent and dependent variables 
precise operational definitions that specify how to manipu-
late the independent variable (in our case, empirical expecta-
tions) and how to measure the dependent variable (conforming 
behavior). 
In the next chapter I will discuss at length how to measure 
norms, and in particular, how to manipulate expectations to 
assess causality. For example, one way to influence empirical ex-
pectations is to tell one group of participants in an experiment 
10. Many interventions have been based on the belief that economic or 
ecological conditions are the most important causal factors, and that 
changing them would dramatically improve the situation. Since many 
such interventions failed, we must be aware that it is of foremost im-
portance to correctly identify causal factors. 
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about the behavior of other participants in a similar past ex-
periment (thereby changing their empirical expectations). 
Another group of participants (the control group) instead is 
not given any information. If there is a significant difference in 
behavior between the two groups, we can be fairly certain that 
expectations matter to choice (Bicchieri and Xiao 2009). 
Another, less precise way to check for a causal connection 
is to ask counterfactual or simply hypothetical questions. If a 
behavioral pattern is very common, we may ask those who con-
form to it what they would do if most people in their reference 
network were to behave differently. Would they stick to the be-
havior? If not, why not? 
Empirical expectations must be coupled with a condi-
tional preference for conforming; otherwise they will have 
no influence on behavior. Conformity may be driven by .the 
desire to imitate or to coordinate with others. But what about 
when normative influences play a stronger role? What about 
behaviors that are keenly endorsed by a reference network, so 
much so that deviation gets punished and compliance praised? 
What about situations in which the expectation of approval 
and disapproval, the acknowledged presence of sanctions, act 
as important motivators? In these cases, we are dealing with 
social norms. 
SOCIAL NORMS 
Consider the following scene. A long line of people is waiting to 
buy a ticket for a popular movie. Someone approaches the first 
person in line and offers a few dollars to take her place. When 
I give this example to my class, students react with outrage. 
"If I were in line behind the guy, I would get mad," and "it is 
unfair to those who wait patiently" are common reactions. If 
the payment is to literally cut in front of the first person, then 
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the exchange is imposing a negative externality on everyone 
behind her in the queue because they now have to wait one 
person longer. She has no right to sell her place. Indeed, paying 
for jumping a queue elicits strong disapproval.ll 
Alternatively, think what would happen if somebody at 
the end of a long line went to the person who was first in line, 
and offered him money to switch places. In this case, nobody 
would be disadvantaged. Nevertheless, many would find this 
exchange objectionable. A common concern is that if we allow 
people to jump ahead in queues of all sorts (as opposed to wait-
ing in line), there is a fundamental sense that people are not 
treated equally. If economic efficiency is the argument, why 
not allow someone to sell her vote as well? While inefficient, 
queues embody a standard of fairness in which nobody is more 
important than another and anyone can be subject to a wait. 
In a world where people can buy their way up, we can imagine 
a class of people who are rich and never have to wait, and a 
class who always must wait because their time is less valuable 
as determined by what they can pay. Many would find such a 
world repulsive. 
In the first example, people would feel entitled to protest, 
even block the transaction. In the second, even if we deeply 
dislike the deal, we usually feel we do not have a right to com-
plain. Why this difference? What makes us feel we have a right 
to expect certain behaviors but not others? The second trans-
action is a private one, and though we may dislike it, we recog-
nize that people have a right to conduct their private business 
as they like. The first example instead created a public nega-
tive externality, as everybody in the line has to wait longer. In 
11. Stanley Milgram (1992) conducted an experiment by sending his stu-
dents around with the instructions to cut in lines at ticket counters. In 
more than half of the cases, people reacted very negatively. Reactions 
ranged from dirty looks, to verbal protests, all the way to physical 
shoves. · 
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this case there would likely be much social support for openly 
and loudly complaining, as opposed to the second case. 
When actions create public negative externalities, societies 
develop rules to curb these effects. Examples are rules that 
enforce cooperation or reciprocation, which are necessary to 
support social interactions. Without cooperation and trust, it 
becomes exceedingly hard, if not impossible, to sustain social 
exchanges. Yet there are other social rules (in addition to pro-
social ones) that can elicit collective support. Child marriage 
does not seem to curb any particular, public negative exter-
nality. In a society where child marriage is the norm, waiting 
to marry off one's daughter will only produce negative conse-
quences for the family and the unmarried girl, not the broader 
society. Yet witnesses to a contravention in such a society will 
feel entitled to blame, gossip about, ostracize, or pity the girl. 
The socially imposed ought is present in these practices, even 
if it is not borne out of a pro-social necessity. 
I believe that the difference between rules that enforce pro-
sociality and other sorts of shared practices stems from their 
origins. The latter may have evolved from simpler descriptive 
norms that, with time, acquired a special symbolic meaning 
(as I discuss further in chapter 3), whereas the former directly 
evolved from a collective need to guarantee a measure of social 
order. Once they are established, both kinds of rules ultimately 
share the same features that identify them as social norms. 
Social norms perform a double function. They tell us that 
particular behavioral responses are warranted in situations that 
are sufficiently similar to each other: you do not cut in a line of 
cars waiting at an intersection, and similarly you do not jump 
in front of people queuing for a cab or waiting to be served in 
a pastry shop. Social norms also express social approval or dis-
approval of such behaviors-they tell us how we ought to act. 
Social norms are often called injunctive norms: what we col-
lectively believe ought to be done, what is socially approved or 
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disapproved of (Rivis and Sheeran 2003). As in the case of de-
scriptive norms, there are ambiguities in this definition, which 
may confound shared moral norms with social norms. For ex-
ample, the moral codes a society or group shares prescribe and/ 
or proscribe specific behaviors, entail evaluations and judg-
ments, and signal the mutual expectation that we ought to abide 
by them. Though some may argue that there really is no differ-
ence between social and moral norms, others would object. 
My objective here is not to examine the nature of moral-
ity. All I want to call attention to is that there is an element of 
(social) unconditionality to what we take to be moral rules that 
is not present in social norms, in the sense that one's personal 
moral convictions are the primary motivator of one's actions, 
and such convictions overwhelm any social considerations. 
I am agnostic as to the existence of moral norms above and 
beyond the reasons people have to follow them. What I want to 
say is that-when we obey what we take to be a "moral" rule-
we do not condition our choice on the behaviors and beliefs of 
other people, at least in principle. So fairness may be a social 
norm for some, but a deeply held moral norm for others. There 
is nothing about fairness that makes it moral, apart from one's 
view that it is a value that one should pursue as best as one can, 
even if one witnesses unfair behavior all the time. 
From a purely descriptive standpoint, what we call "moral-
ity" is a code of conduct that guides behavior. Moral codes regu-
late the behaviors that a society considers to be most important, 
including behaviors that directly or indirectly affect others: rules 
against killing, causing pain, and deceiving are all examples 
of rules that prohibit causing direct or indirect harmP Moral 
codes, however, differ among cultures, as they may also include 
rules of purity, honor, or loyalty that could conflict with what we 
12. These rules are often subject to exceptions. We might believe that we 
must not harm our friends, but it is acceptable to harm our foes. 
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take to be "do no harm" injunctions. Honor killing may be seen, 
by those that stand by it, as a moral duty. In this case, values of 
honor and purity supersede rules against killing. In fact, some 
cultures believe that the actions of a "stray woman" bring shame 
to her entire family, and this shame must be washed away with 
her blood (Feldner 2000). What matters here is that ~very society 
tends to "moralize" certain behaviors. This process of moraliza-
tion happens at an individual level too, but is not uniform in its 
spread. When we say that a norm has been internalized, we often 
refer to the development of moral beliefs that correspond to soci-
etal standards. These beliefs become an independent motivation 
to conform, as deviations are often accompanied by guilt. 
A norm that dictates female genital cutting (FGC) may 
embed important ideals of purity and honor, among others, 
and be part of the moral code of a group or society. For some 
individuals, this rule may be so important that it becomes (so-
cially) unconditional. These individuals do not need to take 
into consideration the behavior of their peers when deciding 
whether to follow the rule. For other individuals, the choice to 
abide by the rule may be conditional on their social expecta-
tions. This is why I do not want to talk of moral rules in gen-
eral, as if they had a status independent of the reasons of the 
individuals who follow them. Honor killing may be a social 
norm for some, a moral norm for others. All of that said, I can 
think of situations in which an individual who has moralized a 
rule may fail to follow it (and not because of weakness of will) . 
Also moral rules can be conditional, but not in the same sense 
social norms are. Some moral rules are more important than 
others and take precedence in cases of conflict, and in some 
situations it is acceptable to abandon or adapt some rules. In a 
state of anarchy, one may conclude that harming and deceiving 
is the only way to survive, but one may do so with great anguish 
and guilt and still endorse (if not follow) general rules against 
harming and deceiving (Bicchieri 2006). 
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I mention here the strong emotion of guilt because it is 
often associated, as a moral emotion, with our commitment 
and conformity to what we take to be moral rules. Yet, as I have 
noted elsewhere (Bicchieri 2010), emotions are not a necessary 
hallmark of morality. One may feel guilty at openly choosing 
an unfair division of money, keeping more for oneself, but con-
veniently give nothing to an unaware party, provided it is plain 
that one's unfair choice is hidden (Dana, Weber, and Kuang 
2007). Would we be willing to say that fairness matters when 
one is "watched," but that it loses its appeal when one can cheat 
in secret? It seems that a better way to distinguish, as far as we 
want to make such a distinction, between the moral and the 
social valence of the rule is to think of the ways in which we 
can justify its transgression. If I am willing to defend my unfair 
decision by pointing out that "others are unfair too," or that "I 
am not really expected to act fairly on this occasion," or even 
that "the other party will believe his misfortune was just bad 
luck," it seems clear that my choice was conditional on having 
certain social expectations. Fairness, in these examples, is not 
a moral norm to be followed no matter what. 
The important point to be made is that we have (in prin-
ciple) reasons for upholding what we take to be moral norms 
that go beyond the fact that we perceive them to be generally 
upheld by a reference network that may reproach deviance. Our 
commitment to these moral norms is independent of what we 
. expect others to believe, do, or approve/disapprove of. Social 
norms instead are always (socially) conditional, in the sense 
that our preference for obeying them depends upon our expec-
tations of collective compliance. This does not mean that we 
may not find good reasons to support some of those norms. 
There are many social norms that we may find socially ben-
eficial, like rules of fairness or reciprocity, but I maintain that 
most people follow them because they know that they are gen-
erally followed and because they expect most individuals in 
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their reference network to keep following them. They also have 
reason to think most individuals in their reference network be-
lieve that they ought to be fair and to reciprocate in the appro-
priate conditions. In the absence of these social expectations, 
one may not reciprocate any longer, despite still believing that, 
in a well-functioning society, reciprocity should be the rule. 
Like descriptive norms, social norms rely upon empirical 
expectations, that is, the belief that others in our reference net-
work follow the norm. However, with social norms, the nor-
mative influence is strong and plays a crucial role in driving 
compliance. It matters to us that most people in our reference 
network believe we ought to conform to a certain behavioral 
pattern. This point must be emphasized. First, let me point out 
that people may think one ought to behave in a specific way 
for many different reasons. Parents who marry off their young 
daughters believe they are protecting them while simultane-
ously affording a good husband at a reasonable dowry price. 
Many Islamic countries require women to cover their bodies 
and faces, for reasons of modesty and family honor. Southern 
whites thought blacks should take menial jobs, to stress their 
alleged cultural and economic inferiority and ultimately to sup-
port a system that favored whites. A gang requires its members 
to wear particular clothes and colors to signal their group iden-
tity and show pride in belonging to that group. We think that 
trust should be reciprocated, because otherwise we would end 
up in a society in which very few transactions would occur. For 
every social norm we may think of, we will find some reason why 
followers think it should be upheld. When a norm is in place, 
we may or may not embrace what we believe are the reasons 
why the norm exists. In other words, we may be more or less 
sensitive or sympathetic to the norm's contentY Yet the social 
13. I shall extensively discuss the role played by norm sensitivity in 
chapter 5, when I discuss norm change. 
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pressure to conform, expressed in the social expectation that 
one ought to conform, is a powerful motivator. I thus define a 
social norm as follows (Bicchieri 2006):14 
A social norm is a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to 
conform to it on condition that they believe that (a) most people in 
their reference network conform to it (empirical expectation), and 
(b) that most people in their reference network believe they ought 
to conform to it (normative expectation). 
If others believe one ought to conform, the reaction to non-
conformity may range from slight displeasure to active or even 
extreme punishment.15 It should be clear that the ought is not 
prudential, because disregarding a prudential ought would not 
normally elicit a negative sanction. My friends may think that I 
ought to diet because being obese threatens my health in many 
ways. However, none of them would dream of punishing me 
because of my bad eating habits; they might tell me that I ought 
to stop, but this would be said out of concern for my wellbeing 
rather than wanting to put me "back in line." 
14. I do not use "behavioral pattern" but instead talk of behavioral rules, 
for the reason that often norms proscribe behaviors, so we do not typi-
cally observe the behavior proscribed by the rule. It is also the case that 
a norm may exist but not be followed at a given time if the potential 
followers ' expectations are not met (Bicchieri 2006, 11). 
15. It is important to clarify that this imposed ought is normative in a 
strong sense, and not necessarily prudential. Other models, such as 
the theory of planned behavior (and its predecessor, the reasoned 
action approach; see Ajzen, Albarracin, and Hornik 2007; Fishbein 
and Ajzen 2011), do not make this distinction, and failing to do so 
can be problematic. The theory of planned behavior relies on the 
measurement of behavior-specific attitudes, "subjective norms," and 
perceived behavioral control to collectively predict behavioral inten-
tions. The subjective norms in the model refer to individuals' expec-
tations of the degree to which "important others" would approve or 
disapprove of their performing a given behavior (Ajzen 1991, 195). 
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The extent of the social reaction to a norm transgression 
varies, depending on how important or central to social life a 
norm is, how entrenched it is, and what sort of real or perceived 
harm disobedience creates. It is also important to acknowledge 
that many norms admit of variations in behavior and that the 
acceptable range of behaviors may be substantial, thus increas-
ing uncertainty as to the scope of deviations and, consequently, 
the appropriate severity of sanctions. 
It is often the case that norms are not "all or nothing" af-
fairs. Fair divisions, for example, may include a 60-40 percent 
share as acceptable. Norms of decorum may tolerate slight 
variations in unkemptness (though up to a point). This quality 
of degrees of acceptability for a norm is well-addressed in the 
Return Potential Model (Jackson 1965). The Return Potential 
Model is a method of visualizing acceptable behavior as con-
strained by norms: on a Y-axis one would plot the amount of 
approval one could garner by engaging in an action, and on an 
X-axis one would plot the intensity or amount of a behavior 
being engaged in (see the example reproduced in Figure 1.1). 
Despite having some predictive efficacy, the model's normative com-
ponent falls short: First, the model always includes a normative pre-
dictor, regardless of whether or not the behavior being predicted is 
normative in nature. Second, the model does not take descriptive 
norms into account (a limitation acknowledged by one of the theory's 
founders; see Fishbein 2007). Finally, as mentioned earlier, the model 
does not appear to differentiate between second-order prudential 
expectations and second-order expectations of a stronger normative 
nature (Ajzen 1991). In other words, the model's normative mea-
surements are too broad: when taking the approach of the theory of 
planned behavior, it will be impossible to determine whether a re-
spondent believes that her peers believe that engaging in a particular 
behavior is wrong because it is unwise (i.e., wrong on a prudential 
level) or that it is wrong because it violates some shared rule (e.g., 
fairness). What I call normative expectations, rather than prudential 
ones, exert a greater influence on a decision maker when choosing 
whether to conform to a social norm. 
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For example, an individual with ten dollars in his pocket who 
is deciding how much money to give to a beggar might think 
that his friends (his reference network) will think he is selfish if 
he gives fewer than four dollars, but they will think that a gift of 
more than seven dollars is just foolish. Here, the individual as-
sumes that there is a happy medium of donating between four 
and seven dollars that will garner approval from his friends. 
In the plot one can identify a "point of maximum return," at 
which an individual will get the maximum possible approval out 
of an action. In the above graph, this point would be at 6 (or six 
dollars in the aforementioned example). The Return Potential 
Model assumes that norm-relevant actions can always either 
improve or damage one's reputation, which might not necessar-
ily be the case (e.g., refusing to defecate in the open when in a 
HIGHLY + 
APPROVE 4 
INDIFFERENT 0 
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FIGURE 1.1 The Return Potential Model (reproduced from Jackson 1965). 
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Western society would not be likely to improve one's reputation, 
but engaging in it would certainly damage one's reputation). 
Additionally, there is also a range of behaviors that are seen as 
acceptable: in the earlier example, a gift of between four and seven 
dollars was perceived to be acceptable. In Bangladesh, a father 
might think that marrying off his daughter below the age of seven 
is too young (she is just a child!) but marrying her off after the age 
of fifteen is too old (people might think she is having premarital 
sex if she gets any older). Similarly, each behavior can garner a 
range of approval or disapproval. That is, the height of the Y-axis 
demonstrates the intensity of positive and negative sanctions that 
norm-adherence or norm-violations incur. The Return Potential 
Model can also reveal how much agreement (i.e., crystallization) 
there is about a norm (though this is not shown in Figure 1.1): 
there might be disagreement about how important the norm is 
or about where the range of acceptable behaviors lies. The more 
disagreement there is on the importance of a norm or on what is 
considered "acceptable," the more disagreement there will be on 
what kind of sanctions are appropriate. The more people disagree 
on what sanctions are appropriate, the more uncertainty there 
will be about the sanctions' magnitudes and likelihoods. 
As I shall discuss in chapter 5, the combination of punish-
ment (mild, serious, or absent) and a person's sensitivity to the 
norm will determine individual compliance. Someone who is 
indifferent to or even disagrees with the norm's content will 
avoid conformity if no sanction is present, whereas someone 
who supports the norm will tend to conform even if no pun-
ishment looms. This individual will usually recognize that the 
request to conform is legitimate, and respond positively. 
Normative expectations may also be accompanied by posi-
tive sanctions, such as liking, appreciation, trust, and respect. 
Again, the existence of strong positive rewards may move the 
indifferent and the contrarian to comply, but it will just rein-
force the supporter's conviction. This is why norms that are (or 
are believed to be) onerous to follow are usually accompanied 
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by strong negative and positive sanctions: in a society in which 
cooperation or reciprocation with strangers is perceived to be 
difficult to obtain, an honest cooperator is praised, and a non-
reciprocator will acquire a bad reputation. A culture that holds 
ideals of family respectability and honor, along with the beliefs 
that women are men's property, are weak, and are easily se-
duced, will impose strict rules of conduct on women and punish 
transgressions harshly. Honor killing is an extreme measure, 
but the reward is high status and social respect. Sometimes 
even norms that are not particularly onerous to follow, like 
a gang's dress code or other outward signs of belonging, are 
supported by significant sanctions, in that disregarding them 
defies the group's identity and signals disrespect. In the TV 
show Sons of Anarchy, a man who belongs to a motorcycle club 
is a "badass." Yet, "You know you're a badass when you'll strap 
down an ex-member and set his back on fire to remove his club 
tattoo."16 Small, close-knit groups are particularly defensive 
about the norms that identify them, and are ready to punish 
deviators who threaten the very identity of the group. 
Let me point out again that the cost of deviating from a 
descriptive norm, ~specially a convention, is very different 
from the cost of deviating from a social norm. Deviating from 
a convention, such as a linguistic one, is inherently costly to 
the deviating party. Once a convention is established, every-
one does better by following it, especially when it is expected 
that everyone else adheres to it. Norms are not self-enforcing in 
the sense that conventions are. With a norm, there is often the 
temptation to transgress it-this is precisely why norms must 
be socially enforced. Without these systems of sanctions, the 
norm could easily fall apart. 
16. In the show, the person had been required to remove his tattoo, and 
since he did not, they burned it off of him so no one would mistake him 
for a member in good standing. http://www.sidereel.com/posts/36137-
news-missing-sons-of-anarchy-top-1 0-badass-moments-featured. 
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Here, my aim is not to draw a taxonomy of norms and ac-
companying sanctions, but rather to stress the relation of con-
ditional preferences to empirical and normative expectations. 
I have argued that conformity to a social norm can be completely 
independent of attributing value to the norm one obeys. We may 
be induced to obey norms we dislike, or reject behaviors that we 
find perfectly appropriate. Often, however, especially with norms 
that are well established, norm followers tend to value what the 
norm stands for. An external observer may be induced to think 
that, since people have a positive attitude toward a norm, they 
may obey it regardless of what others around them do. Social 
expectations do not seem important anymore! 
In fact, we may be tempted to explain why a given behavior 
persists by referring to the observation that most individuals in 
the network where it is commonly practiced share the conviction 
that it is good and valuable. We do not seem to be facing con-
ditional preferences here: individuals behave in a similar way 
because they all think such behavior carries some advantage. 
Is this a correct conclusion? Recall what I said about causal-
ity. It involves counterfactual dependence: all other things being 
equal, if an individual did not have a positive belief toward x, 
she would not do x. What seems required is changing the posi-
tive belief alone. Information interventions failed at changing 
some negative practices, such as new mothers' refusal to breast-
feed immediately after giving birth, because they missed the 
fact that people had social expectations and conditional prefer-
ences based on them. Information was introduced with the in-
tention of changing factual and personal normative beliefs about 
the importance of immediate and continuous breastfeeding, the 
damages of giving newborns water (often contaminated), and the 
connection between infant mortality and traditional practices. 
Such interventions were not accompanied by the understanding 
that the practice was supported by widely held social expectations, 
both empirical and normative. Even if we were to succeed at con-
vincing a young mother of the benefits of immediate breastfeeding, 
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would she dare incur the wrath of her mother-in-law, the scorn of 
other women, and the accusation that she was risking the life of 
her child? This problem is particularly acute in cases of pluralistic 
ignorance (a concept that I will explore later on). 
I realize that it might be a bit daunting to keep track of the 
various factors that determine the nature of a collective behavior. 
Now that I have clarified the features of each collective practice 
(in terms of preferences and social expectations), I have included 
a visual summary of the diagnostic process of identifying a 
social norm and differentiating it from other collective behaviors 
in Figure 1.2. I will explore in the following chapter how we can 
reach a diagnostic conclusion through measurement. 
Observe a collective 
pattern of behavior 
People prefer to People prefer to 
follow It Irrespective follow it if they have 
of what others do Social Expectations 
J 
Empirical and 
Collective Custom, Empirical Expectations Normative 
shared Moral Rule or suffice to motivate Expectations are 
Legal Injunction action needed to motivate 
action 
I 
Descriptive Norm Social Norm 
FIGURE 1.2 Diagnostic process of identifying collective behaviors. 
Source: C. Bicchieri, Social Norms, Social Change. Penn-UNICEF Lecture, 
July 2012. 
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BELIEF TRAPS: PLURALISTIC 
IGNORANCE 
Consider the case of a social norm N present in a network G. 
We know the following: 
1. All members of G believe that all other members of G 
followN. 
2. All members of G believe that all other members of G 
believe one ought to follow N. 
However, it is not true that all members of G believe one ought 
to follow N. In fact, the majority of individuals dislike Nand do 
not think one ought to follow it. In a UNICEF study about vio-
lence on children, it was stunning to realize that caregivers who 
report a negative judgment on punishment still punish in large 
numbers (country median: 50 percent)Y One possible explana-
tion for this disparity is that these caregivers observe corporal 
punishment, or corporal punishment's consequences, such as 
bruises, and have no reason to believe that those who conform 
to the norm dislike it as much as they do. They dare not speak 
out or openly transgress, for fear of being regarded as weak or 
uncaring parents. In this way a norm nobody actually likes 
will survive, and if deviations occur, they will be kept secret. 
This is an example of pluralistic ignorance, a cognitive state in 
which each member of a group believes her personal norma-
tive beliefs and preferences are different from those of similarly 
situated others, even if public behavior is identical (Miller and 
McFarland 1987). The following set of conditions is a fertile 
ground for pluralistic ignorance (Bicchieri 2006, ch. 5; 2014): 
a) Individuals engage in social comparison with their 
reference network. We constantly observe what others 
17. www.childinfo.org./discipline.htrnl. 
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do, and from these observations we get clues about ap-
propriate behavior, others' preferences, beliefs, and so 
forth. In the case of norms, we are influenced by the 
behavior of other network members, but we do not 
know the true distribution of their beliefs and pref-
erences, which we try to infer from observing their 
behavior. 
b) Others' behavior is observable. If not, then the conse-
quences of such behavior are observable.18 
c) No transparent communication is possible. Because of 
shared values, religious reasons, or simply the fear of 
being shunned or ridiculed as a deviant or just differ-
ent, we do not express views that we think will put us 
at a disadvantage. 
d) We assume that, unlike us, others' behavior is consis-
tent with their preferences and beliefs. There are several 
possible reasons why this might occur. Fear of embar-
rassment or the desire to fit in are not easy to observe 
in others, so we may come to believe that we experience 
these emotions more strongly than others do. Another 
possible cause of the self/other discrepancy is the fun-
damental attribution error (Ross 1977): we tend to over-
estimate the extent to which others act on private mo-
tives (beliefs, preferences), while we instead attribute 
our own behavior to external factors (social pressure in 
this case). 
e) We infer that all but us endorse the observed norm. We 
discount personal evidence in favor of what we observe 
and take it at face value. 
18. For example, compliance with norms that regulate sexual behavior or 
other unobservable behaviors can be assessed by observing the pres-
ence or absence of the consequences of such behaviors. In the case of 
norms that prohibit pre-marital sex, teen pregnancies would be a sign 
that the norm has been flouted. 
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All end up conforming to the public norm, oblivious to the 
possibility that they are participants in a group dynamic 
in which all pretend to support the norm, while in fact all 
dislike it. 
In a state of pluralistic ignorance, individuals are caught 
in a belief trap and will keep following a norm that they deeply 
dislike. How long can this last? One may suspect that a norm 
that is so disliked would not be stable, since even small shocks 
to the system of beliefs that support it would lead to its demise. 
Once the frequency of true beliefs is conveyed to the relevant 
population, a change would occur. Such change may be feasible 
with a descriptive norm, but it is much more difficult to obtain 
in the case of a social norm. 
Berkowitz and Perkins (1987; see also Berkowitz 2005) 
have taken advantage of the effectiveness of beliefs shocks, 
public revelations of pluralistic ignorance, when attempting 
to change maladaptive descriptive norms that are maintained 
by pluralistic ignorance, particularly alcohol consumption on 
college campuses. Their approach is designed to stop people 
from engaging in a collective practice by informing them 
that participation rates (typically drinking rates) are lower 
than they might appear. Such information serves to update a 
target audience's empirical expectations. This approach, when 
properly implemented, is effective at combatting descriptive 
norms that suffer from pluralistic ignorance (which are sup-
ported by inaccurate empirical expectations), but is not ef-
fective at changing independent practices, such as customs 
(if you inform people that fewer of their peers use umbrel-
las than they previously thought, why should they care?), or 
social norms, which are additionally supported by normative 
expectations. 
Since a social norm is supported by normative expectations, 
it is not sufficient to publically disclose that most individuals 
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dislike the norm and would like to do something different. The 
participants must also be sure that its abandonment will not be 
followed by negative sanctions. People face a double credibility 
problem here: they must believe that the information they re-
ceive about others' true beliefs is accurate, and they must also 
believe that everyone else is committed to change their ways. 
There are many ways to achieve these goals, and there are sev-
eral examples in the literature of successful changes of negative 
norms by means of information campaigns, public declarations, 
and common pledges (Bicchieri and Mercier 2014). Any suc-
cessful change, as I shall argue in the last two chapters, must 
change both empirical and normative expectations, their rela-
tive order depending on whether a norm is being created or 
abandoned. 
Whether we are facing pluralistic ignorance is an entirely 
empirical question. A few years ago, a friend from UNICEF 
presented me with the following data, confessing she was at a 
loss as to how to interpret them.19 
She noted that in Sudan, Djibuti, and Burkina Paso 
there was a significant discrepancy between the prevalence 
of FGC and its support among women who would have been 
directly involved in getting their daughters cut. However, 
in places like Chad, prevalence and support were very much 
in line. 20 At the time, I knew that women were only ques-
tioned about their attitudes, not about their expectations, 
19. The data sources in Table 1.3 are UNICEF global databases, based 
on DHS, MICS, and other nationally representative surveys. See 
more at: http://data.unicef.org/child-protection/fgmc.html#sthash. 
jV8FtLDS.dpuf. 
20. It is important to notice that the 49.4 percent of women who supported 
the practice in Chad might not overlap with the 44.9 percent who actu-
ally engaged in the practice. In this respect, it is important to consider the 
strength of a social norm in a population. For example, we would have to 
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Table 1.3 
FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING PREVALENCE VS. 
SUPPORT OF THE PRACTICE AMONG WOMEN 15-49 
Area name Time Prevalence Support Dataset sources 
period 
Somalia 2006 97.9 64.5 MICS 2006 
Guinea 2005 95.6 69.2 DHS 2005 
Djibouti 2006 93.1 36.6 MICS 2006, table CPS. 
Egypt 2008 91.1 54 DHS 2008, table 15.1, 
p. 197 
Sudan 2006 89.3 23.7 SHHS 2006 
Mali 2007 85.2 76 DHS 2006 
Ethiopia 2005 74.3 31.4 DHS 2005, 
table 16.13, p. 253 
Burkina 2006 72.5 11.1 MICS 2006, table CPS. 
Fa so 
Mauritania 2007 72.2 53.4 MICS 2007 
Chad 2004 44.9 49.4 DHS 2004, table 11.1, 
page 170 
Yemen 1997 22.6 41 DHS 1997 
especially normative ones. It was possible that in Sudan 
women did not dare express their true preferences and be-
liefs and kept performing a ritual that was expected of them, 
without being aware they were not the lone deviants. It is 
also possible that women knew about other women's opin-
ions, but were forced to perform the ritual, or that the prac-
tice was so ubiquitous that it had become naturalized and 
consider the central tendency (that is, how strong the norm is) in differ-
ent groups, as well as the norm dispersion (that is, how uniformly groups 
conform to the norm). Typically, a social norm is very strong where there 
is a clear and high central tendency and very little dispersion. 
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people did not even consider alternatives, even if they might 
not have had a strong preference for it. To know the reasons 
for the discrepancy, we must be able to measure normative 
expectations, and check whether perceived and objective 
consensus differ. Measuring expectations is precisely what 
I recommend doing in the next chapter, when I tackle the 
issue of norm measurement. 
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CONCLUSION 
Many programs designed to curb the incidence of sexual be-
haviors that spread AIDS, induce people to build and use 
latrines, educate girls, or convince families not to marry off 
their very young daughters have failed. Program failures have 
taught us that causal factors that drive collective behaviors 
have to be addressed in order to change descriptive and social 
norms, and the first, most important step in a successful inter-
vention is precisely to identify causal relations. I have main-
tained that experiments are the best way to assess causal rela-
tions. However, it may be very difficult to manipulate personal 
evaluations in an experiment. 21 What we can do is influence 
expectations about what others do or believe should be done 
(that is, alter normative and empirical expectations). In other 
words, if we were to believe that social expectations play no role 
in directing behavior, then altering them experimentally (cre-
ating or eliminating them) should not change the behavior of 
individuals who have expressed a positive evaluation (through 
a survey) of the behavior in question. I will return to this im-
portant point in the chapter on measurement. For the time 
being, let me remind the reader that the link between personal 
normative beliefs and behavior is not necessarily strong (Eagly 
and Chaiken 1993). People may say that they approve or disap-
prove of something, but when we look at their actions we often 
see no consistency with their evaluative judgments. 
In defining social norms as I did, I have stressed the role 
of conditional preferences and social expectations. In other 
words, I have relied upon the reasons that make people behave 
21. We may give damning information about a company (it uses slave 
labor!) and thus change a subject's personal evaluation of that com-
pany, but it would be· much harder to change personal evaluations 
about common, valued, and long-established practices. 
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as they do. Understanding these reasons is critical to instigat-
ing social change, as I shall discuss further in chapter 3. If we 
believe social norms have causal efficacy, we must be ready to 
show that, were the expectations that support a norm absent, 
the norm would no longer be followed. Since the preference for 
following a social norm is conditional upon having the right 
kind of social expectations, altering expectations should affect 
behavior in significant ways. 
Again, experiments are the best means to check whether 
empirical and normative expectations matter to choice and 
under what conditions. Yet there are many situations in which 
experiments are difficult or impossible to perform, and we may 
have to fall back on surveys and vignettes to assess whether a 
norm is present and how and when it influences behavior. In 
the following chapter I shall provide tools for measuring norms 
and ways to check the causal p~thways that link a social norm 
to actions. 
